OPINION by Prof Tariq Ramadan - There has
been no “Arab spring;” the perfume of its revolutions burns the eyes
like tear gas. For two years now I have often been asked why I have not
visited Egypt, where I had been forbidden entry for 18 years. Just as
often I repeated that on the basis of the information I was able to
obtain — confirmed by Swiss and European officials — the Egyptian army
remained firmly in control and had never left the political arena.
I never shared the widespread “revolutionary” enthusiasm. Nor did I
believe that events in Egypt, any more than in Tunisia, were the result
of a sudden historical upheaval. The peoples of these two countries
suffered from dictatorship, from economic and social crisis; they rose
up in the name of dignity, social justice, and freedom.
Their awakening, their “intellectual revolution,” and their courage
must be saluted. But to accept or justify a simple-minded, linear
explanation of the political, geostrategic, and economic issues would
have been totally unconscionable. Nearly three years ago, in a book and
then in a series of articles, I alerted my readers to a body of
troubling evidences, and to the underlying geopolitical and economic
considerations that were often missing from mainstream political and
media analyses, and that insisted on submitting the euphoria that
accompanied the “Arab spring” to critical analysis.
The Army Never Left
The Egyptian army has not returned to politics for the simple reason
that it has never left. The fall of Hosni Mubarak was a military coup
d’état that allowed a new generation of officers to enter the political
scene in a new way, from behind the curtain of a civilian government. In
an article published on June 29, 2012 I noted an Army high command
declaration that the presidential election was temporary, for a
six-month to one-year period (its title made the premonition explicit:
“An election for nothing?”).
The American administration had monitored the entire process: its
objective ally in Egypt over the past fifty years has been the army, not
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The latest revelations (see the
International Herald Tribune, July 5, and Le Monde, July 6) confirm what
was already clear: the decision to overthrow President Mohamed Mursi
had been made well before June 30.
A conversation between President Mursi and General al-Sisi indicated
that the head of the country’s military had planned the overthrow and
imprisonment of the president weeks before the popular upheaval that
would justify the military coup “in the name of the people’s will.” A
clever strategy! Orchestrate demonstrations involving millions of people
in order to make believe that the army truly cares about the people!
Coup d’état, second act.
How then to analyze the immediate reaction of the American
administration, which avoided using the term “coup d’état” (which, if
accepted, would mean it could not provide financial support to the new
regime)? A curious position for a government that in its “surprise” uses
exactly the right words to exert full political, economic, and legal
leverage over the coup makers. European governments will follow suit, of
course: the army has responded “democratically” to the call of the
people.
It’s all too good to be true! Magically, chronic blackouts, gasoline,
and natural gas shortages came to an abrupt end after the fall of the
president. It was as though people had been deprived of the basic
necessities in order to drive them into the streets. Amnesty
International observed the strange attitude of the armed forces, which
did not intervene in certain demonstrations (even though it was closely
monitoring them), allowing the violence to spiral out of control, as
though by design.
The armed forces then accompanied its intervention with a saturation
public relations campaign, providing the international media with
photographs taken from its helicopters, depicting the Egyptian
population as it cheered and celebrated their military saviors, as
confirmed in Le Monde. Nothing, then, has really changed: the “Arab
spring” and the Egyptian “revolution” continue under the guiding hand of
General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi. Trained by the United States Army, the
general has kept close contact with his American counterparts.
The New International Herald Tribune (July 6-7) informs us that
General al-Sisi is well known to the Americans, as well as to the
government of Israel, with which he “and his office,” we are told,
continued to “communicate and to coordinate” even while Mohamed Mursi
occupied the presidential palace. Al-Sisi had earlier served in the
Military Intelligence Services in the North Sinai, acting as go-between
for the American and Israeli authorities. It would hardly be an
understatement to say that Israel, like the US, could only look
favorably upon developments in Egypt.
Mursi’s Mistakes
What, after the fact, is surprising is the simple-mindedness, the
lack of experience, and the nature of the mistakes made by Mohamed
Mursi, by his allies, and by the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization.
For the last three years, I have been sharply critical of the thinking,
action and strategies of the “Liberty and Justice” party, as well as of
the MB leadership (over the last twenty-five years, my analyses and
commentary have been and remain sharply critical). The trap seemed
glaringly obvious; my writings on the subject (book, and articles
written between March and December 2012) pointed to grave shortcomings.
President Mursi cannot be fairly criticized for not doing all he
could to establish relations with the opposition, either by inviting it
to join the government or to take part in a broad national dialogue. But
his approaches were rejected out of hand, with the opposition bitterly
opposing his every initiative. The fact remains, however, that his
management of the business of state, his failure to listen to the voice
of the people and even to some of his trusted advisors, his exclusivist
relationship with the highest echelons of the MB leadership, his hasty
and ill-considered decisions (some of which he later acknowledged as
errors) must be unsparingly criticized.
But on a more fundamental level, his greatest fault has been the
utter absence of a political vision and the lack of clearly established
political and economic priorities, his failure to struggle against
corruption and poverty, and his egregious mismanagement of social and
educational affairs. The demands of the International Monetary Fund (and
its deliberate procrastination) placed the state in an untenable
position: the Mursi government believed that the international
institution would support it. It is only today, now that President Mursi
has fallen, that the IMF appears prepared to remove what were
previously insurmountable obstacles. This comes after mere three days of
the overthrow of a democratically elected government.
The naivety of the president, of his government and of the Muslim
Brotherhood has been stunning. After sixty years of opposition and
military repression (with the direct and indirect benediction of the US
Administration and the West), how could they possibly have imagined that
their former adversaries would support their rise to power, invoking
democracy all the while? Did they learn nothing from their own history,
from Algeria in 1992, and, more recently, from Palestine?
I have been and remain critical, both of the (superficial) content of
their program and the ambiguous strategy of President Mursi and the
Muslim Brotherhood (compromise with the armed forces and the US,
surrender on the economy and the Palestinian cause, etc.) but their lack
of political awareness has been quite simply stupefying. To hear
President Mursi tell General al-Sisi, a mere ten days before his
overthrow, that he might well demote him (after all, he had appointed
him) and that the Americans would “never permit a coup d’état” was as
mind-boggling as it was surrealistic.
Salafis, al-Baradie, and Foreign Ties
Some observers were startled to see the Salafis, in particular the
Nour party, join forces with the military alongside the “democratic”
faction opposed to President Mursi. Were the outcome not so tragic, it
would be tempting to label it farce. The Western media were quick to
label the “Islamist” Salafis as allies of the Muslim Brotherhood while,
in point of fact, they were and are allies of the regimes of the Gulf
States, who are in turn the regional allies of the US. The idea was to
undermine the religious credibility of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to
force it into extreme positions. At the moment of President Mursi’s
overthrow, they not only betrayed him but revealed their strategy and
their strategic alliances for the entire world to see.
It is hardly surprising to note that the first countries to recognize
the new coup d’état regime were the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia,
and Qatar, whose powerful organizations provided, and still provide,
direct and indirect financial support to the Egyptian Salafis (as well
as to their Tunisian counterparts). A superficial reading might lead one
to believe that Saudi Arabia and Qatar support the Muslim Brotherhood;
in reality they are the mainstays of American power in the region. The
strategy is to sow division among the various political Islamic trends,
to foment confrontation and to destabilize. This same strategy focuses
on contradictions between Sunni political organizations and exacerbates
divisions between Shia and Sunni.
The United States and Europe have no quarrel with the political Islam
of the Salafi literalists of the Gulf States (and their denial of
democracy, their non-respect of minorities, their discrimination against
women, and the application of a strict “Islamic” penal code described
as “shari’ah”); they protect their geostrategic and regional economic
interests while their repressive and retrograde domestic policies, as
long as they are applied domestically, could not matter less to the
West.
It’s all about keeping up appearances. Millions of Egyptians rallied
in support of the “second revolution” and appealed to the armed forces,
which were quick to respond. They now promise to turn over power to the
civilians. The leader of the opposition, Mohamed al-Baradei, has played a
central role in the process, and his prominence has been growing apace.
He has been in close touch with the youthful cyber-dissidents and the
April 6 Movement since 2008; documents of the US State Department,
which I quote in my book, point to his close connection with the
American administration. His visibility has been promoted by a clever
strategy, and even though he has declined the position of Prime Minister
(and announced that he will not be a candidate for president, which has
yet to be seen), he has emerged as an important player on the Egyptian
political scene.
He has notoriously — and democratically — defended the arrest of
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the closing of their television
stations and the entire range of repressive measures imposed on citizens
who continue to support President Mursi, even though they may not be MB
members (some are supporting democratic legitimacy). The weeks to come
will provide us with more details about plans for fleshing out the
civilian character of this particular military state. It must be
remembered that for decades the Egyptian army has managed close to 40
percent of the national economy as well as being the leading recipient
of an annual American aid package of $1.5 billion.
Media-Military Operation
An elected president has been toppled by a military coup d’état.
There is no other word for it. The people, in their legitimate desire
for a better life and for survival, for justice and dignity, have been
unwitting participants in a media-military operation of the highest
order. The situation is grave; the silence of Western governments tells
us all we need to know. There has been no “Arab spring;” the perfume of
its revolutions burns the eyes like tear gas.
In our day, it is not unusual for writer who does not accept the
official consensus to be dismissed as a “conspiracy theorist,” for his
analysis to be rejected before studying the facts upon which it is
based. Are we to conclude that in our globalizing age, with its networks
of national security policies and structures and its new means of
communication, political scheming, malicious stratagems, and
manipulation of information and of peoples are a thing of the past?
“Conspiracy theorist” is a new insult devised for those who think the
wrong thoughts, who don’t fit in; paranoids, people who ascribe occult
powers to certain states (the US, the European countries, Israel, the
Arab and African dictatorships, etc.) that they really do not possess.
We must forget what we learned about the conspiracies that have left
their mark on the history of Latin America and Africa (from the
assassination of Salvador Allende to the elimination of Thomas Sankara).
We must overlook the lies that led to the invasion of Iraq and to the
massacres in Gaza (both presented as legitimate defense); we must say
nothing about the West’s alliance with and support for the literalist
Salafis of the Gulf sheikhdoms; close our eyes to the benefit for Israel
of regional instability and of the most recent coup d’état in Egypt. We
must remain naïve and credulous if we are not to notice that the US and
Europe on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other, have agreed
to disagree on Syria, and that the 170 Syrians who die each day count
for nothing against the strategic and economic interests of the Great
Powers.
Our obligation is to stick to the facts, to avoid oversimplification.
The polar opposite of an over-simplified reading of events is not
“conspiracy theorizing” but that of intelligence informed by history, by
hard facts and by a detailed analysis of conflicting interests. The
interpretation presented here may well be wrong or inexact, but
substantial and verifiable evidence has repeatedly confirmed it.From
those who have criticized or challenged our analysis, we look forward to
a fact-based counter-analysis far from denigrations and facile slogans.
When people refuse to call a military coup d’état by its real name, and
when most media avert their eyes, the hour for critical conscience has
struck.
Tariq Ramadan is Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies at
Oxford University (Oriental Institute, St Antony’s College ). He is also
teaching at the Faculty of Theology at Oxford. He is at the same time a
Visiting Professor in Qatar (Faculty of Islamic Studies) and in Morocco
(Mundiapolis) and a Senior Research Fellow at Doshisha University
(Kyoto, Japan). Through his writings and lectures he has contributed
substantially to the debate on contemporary Islamic issues, Islamic
revival in the world and Muslims in the West. He is active both at the
academic and grassroots levels lecturing extensively throughout the
world on theology, Islamic law and jurisprudence, applied ethics,
philosophy, social justice, economy, politics, interfaith and
intracommunity dialogue. Professor Tariq Ramadan is currently President
of the European think tank: European Muslim Network (EMN) in Brussels. AGENCIES
Last modified on Tuesday, 16 July 2013 18:53
Courtesy Voice of the Cape
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